Most analysts tend to focus on events like AfriForum and Solidarity lobbying for US intervention or Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky’s ill-fated visit to Washington. However, an ugly and unprecedented confrontation in the Oval Office hammered home how a transactional approach to diplomacy, providing aid and cooperation only if the recipient pays, could impact the United States’ economic and geopolitical relations with other countries and regions under Trump.

This transactional philosophy threatens to upend decades of US engagement with Africa, Europe and multilateral organisations. In short, Trump is driving countries, regional blocs and the UN system into a state of nowhereism or vacuous diplomacy.

As television cameras rolled, Trump and Vice President JD Vance publicly berated Zelensky, calling him “ungrateful,” “disrespectful” and “gambling with millions of lives.” The extraordinary scene, in which Ukraine’s ambassador to the US held her head in her hands, was widely interpreted as a defining moment of Trump’s second term, showcasing his ‘up-yours’ transactional approach to diplomacy. Furthermore, Trump has used his mighty pen to issue controversial executive orders that are targeted at specific issues and countries to extract political concessions.

For example, South Africa and the International Criminal Court (ICC) are at the receiving end of Trump’s rage for pushing the genocidal case against Israel. Other UN bodies have also felt the impact of his unyielding stance, as he has withdrawn the US membership and voiced support for less conventional, more unilateral methods of international engagement.

This deeper and more structural shift redefines US-Africa relations under Trump’s foreign policy, particularly his “user-pay” principle: countries seeking American support must pay for it directly or through favourable trade and diplomatic agreements.

Trump’s stance, which considers international aid and cooperation as a bargaining chip, also risks alienating countries that have historically relied on the US for support in trade, development and global peace. This article explores how this approach shapes Africa’s economic and geopolitical engagements with the US.

The End of Free Assistance? US Aid and Development Under Trump

Historically, Washington has played a crucial role in African development through various aid programmes and interventions, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). However, the Trump administration has continued to be sceptical about foreign aid, further enforcing a cost-sharing model that forces African nations to bear more of the financial burden.

For example, the Executive Order on Reevaluating And Realigning United States Foreign Aid directed all relevant US government agencies to implement a 90-day pause on the commitment and distribution of new foreign development assistance funds.

This measure was designed to enable a systematic evaluation of program effectiveness, with the ultimate goal of realigning foreign aid initiatives to reflect better and support the priorities of US foreign policy. However, the consequences of such a move have been significant. The US is the world’s largest aid donor, disbursing USD 64.7 billion globally and USD 14.9 billion to Africa in 2023.

Many African countries depend on these funds for critical infrastructure, public health and security. With Trump’s renewed ‘America First’ approach, African countries are now seeking alternative funding sources, potentially turning to China, the European Union or regional bodies for financial and technical support. This is not as simple as it seems in the bigger scheme.

While some commentators argue that Trump’s transactional approach could decrease US influence on the continent in the long run, Zelensky’s hostile treatment is more like an indicator of what is about to come. In all fairness, Africa has nowhere to go since the current environment creates opportunities for competitors to impose similar conditions of cooperation.

Trump’s obsession with critical minerals, including rare earth elements, implies more pressure on African countries, who may be forced to toe the line as the US demands reciprocity for aid and preferential trade concessions under AGOA.

In the past, the Senate Chicken Caucus forced South Africa to eliminate barriers to US poultry imports, and the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs also demanded a “review” of US-SA relations due to Pretoria’s alleged choices that undermined “United States national security and foreign policy interests”.

The current era provides fertile ground for many in Washington to upscale and pile similar demands on African states, especially as AGOA lapses in 2025 and aid is waning. Therefore, many countries benefiting from MCC, PEPFAR and AGOA could be forced into similar arrangements as the US-Ukraine Minerals Deal. Such a political step would counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and frustrate its commercial diplomacy.

Security Cooperation in a Transactional World

Beyond development aid, Trump’s approach has already reshaped security cooperation. Africa has long relied on US support for military training, counterterrorism initiatives, and peacekeeping operations. However, this assistance could soon come with a hefty price tag under Trump’s model.

Trump’s scepticism toward funding military alliances without financial reciprocity mirrors his criticism of NATO and other defence arrangements. In Africa, where the US has assisted in combating insurgencies like Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the shift to a user-pay model risks limiting access to critical resources support.

African countries may be compelled to acquire military equipment and training from U.S. contractors, resulting in significant costs many cannot afford. Although this approach could be considered a necessary adjustment in the global financial landscape, it risks undermining Africa’s sovereignty.

It also pushes African states into increasingly commercialised defence arrangements with Washington, Moscow or Beijing,  superpowers with their own strategic interests.

The Global Tax Deal and Its Implications

Another significant shift under Trump’s administration is the withdrawal from the OECD Global Tax Deal, which aimed to set a minimum tax rate of 15% for multinational companies to curb tax avoidance, particularly from developing countries.

With Africa losing an estimated USD 90 billion annually to illicit financial flows, far more than the continent receives in aid, this withdrawal seriously threatens the region’s economic stability.

Countries may feel compelled to offer even more lenient tax incentives to attract US investment, creating a race to the bottom in tax standards. While this could increase short-term capital inflows, it undermines Africa’s long-term development goals. 

For instance, with their relatively sophisticated economies, South Africa and Nigeria could suffer from diminished tax revenue, hindering their efforts to fund vital public services and infrastructure.

What Lies Ahead for Africa?

The US-Africa relationship is entering a transformative phase under Trump’s second term. His administration’s stance on critical minerals, such as rare earths and cobalt, and its continued scepticism toward foreign aid programmes may profoundly shape Africa’s economic and geopolitical future.

Key initiatives like AGOA and PEPFAR are expected to face challenges, with questions regarding their reauthorisation and sustainability. Furthermore, rising competition from China, the European Union, and emerging middle powers such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Turkey heightens the pressure on the US to find new engagement methods.

Gerald Imray, Mogomotsi Magome, Farai Mutsaka and Mark Banchereau argue that “Africa knew Trump’s ‘America First’ pledge meant it might be last.” “But they hadn’t expected the abrupt halt to foreign aid from the world’s largest donor that stops money flowing for wide-ranging projects like disease response, girls’ education and free school lunches.”

Trump’s approach to foreign relations is proving to be a game-changer: no African country can claim an immediate response to his political onslaught. Even the so-called American competitors cannot offer the same level of assistance or investment, meaning Africa could soon be handed a hefty bill like Ukraine.

At the 2022 US-Africa Leaders’ Summit, African leaders from 49 countries gathered to discuss various issues, from economic growth to climate change and to reinforce the importance of stronger ties between the US and Africa. The next summit would have one agenda point mirroring Zelensky’s visit if it were to occur. Trump and Vance would declare that the American taxpayer “is going to get their money back” through minerals pacts with African countries as a condition for aid and trade preference.

The assumption is that, just as the expected return from the Ukraine support is estimated at USD 1 trillion, Africa could be in for the highest jump. Canada and Greenland may be immediate targets, but Africa is the ultimate destination.

One significant development in this regard is the reauthorisation of the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), which, if approved, could provide a platform for US businesses to expand in Africa. While the DFC’s pro-business approach offers opportunities for increased investment and infrastructure development, it may come with conditions limiting the potential for deeper strategic partnerships and broader developmental assistance.

As debates about USAID funding intensify, some propose alternative aid models focused on private-sector investments. Africa’s response to these changes will be crucial in shaping the future of US-Africa relations, balancing economic opportunities with the continent’s development goals.

As Trump’s user-pay model becomes the foundation of US-Africa relations, African countries face challenges in adapting quickly. Some countries, like South Africa and Nigeria, theoretically possess the economic capacity to negotiate commercial partnerships with the US, while smaller economies struggle to keep up.

This divergence could lead to a more fragmented African response to US policies, with wealthier states engaging in selective cooperation while poorer ones remain stuck. However, observing how Trump interacts with opponents and supposed allies reveals little room for negotiation. 

While events like AfriForum’s US lobbying efforts and Zelensky’s diplomatic struggles capture immediate attention, the underlying transformation of US foreign policy under Trump carries more profound implications. The painted picture in this article signals a difficult road ahead for the African continent, but there could also be a silver lining in this dark cloud.

Trump’s emergence allows Africa to reassess its diplomatic strategies to navigate a more transactional global order and think much more deeply about its economic development imperatives, prioritising self-sufficiency and less reliance on aid and FDI.

Siya yi banga le economy!

Siyabonga Hadebe is a PhD candidate in international economic law and a labour market expert based in Geneva.